Belmont Law Review
Volume 4 Symposium 2016: The Modern Metropolis –
Contemporary Legal Issues in Urban Communities
2017

The Middle Class, Urban Schools, and Choice
Michael Lewyn
Touro College - Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.belmont.edu/lawreview
Part of the Legal Writing and Research Commons
Recommended Citation
Lewyn, Michael (2017) "The Middle Class, Urban Schools, and Choice," Belmont Law Review: Vol. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://repository.belmont.edu/lawreview/vol4/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Belmont Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Belmont Law Review by an authorized editor of Belmont Digital Repository. For more information, please contact repository@belmont.edu.

Article 4

THE MIDDLE CLASS, URBAN
SCHOOLS, AND CHOICE
MICHAEL LEWYN*

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 85
I. THE PROBLEM: NO BAD SCHOOLS, ONLY WEAK STUDENTS ................. 86
II. WHY ARE URBAN SCHOOLS POVERTY-PACKED? ................................. 90
III. USEFUL BUT IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS ................................................... 96
(1). Universal Vouchers ................................................................ 97
(2). Public Schools Only ............................................................... 99
(3). Charter Schools .................................................................... 100
(4). Exam Schools ....................................................................... 102
(5). Choice vs. Equity ................................................................. 103
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 106
INTRODUCTION
It is common knowledge that middle- and upper-class parents tend
to disfavor urban public schools, and that they often move to suburbs in
order to avoid having to send their children to those schools.1 Thus, the
condition of urban public schools contributes to suburban sprawl—that is,
the movement of people and jobs from city to suburb. Because most
suburbs are highly dependent on automobiles,2 such sprawl makes it more
difficult for people without cars to reach jobs and other destinations, as well

*Associate Professor, Touro Law Center. Wesleyan University, B.A.; University of
Pennsylvania, J.D.; University of Toronto, L.L.M.
1. See, e.g., Erika K. Wilson, Gentrification and Urban Public School Reforms: The
Interest Divergence Dilemma, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 677, 680 (2015) (in recent decades,
“white middle-class residents either avoided the public schools or moved out of the city once
they had school-aged children.”).
2. Cf. OLIVER GILLHAM, THE LIMITLESS CITY 4 (2002) (citing numerous definitions
of sprawl, some of which emphasize automobile-oriented development).
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as increasing greenhouse gas emissions and other forms of automobilerelated pollution.3
This Article discusses a variety of possible solutions to the
unpopularity of urban schools among middle-class parents. Part I of this
Article suggests that this problem is a cause as well as a result of middleclass flight: that is, urban schools have poor reputations because their
students come from lower-class backgrounds, thus causing poor test scores,
thus causing poor reputations, thus causing additional middle-class flight.
Part II of this Article describes the legal doctrines that have led to the status
quo. Part III discusses the pros and cons of several policies that might lure
middle-class families into cities, focusing on policies designed to enhance
parental choice. This Article concludes that each of these solutions could
make cities more appealing to affluent parents, but no solution is cost-free.
I. THE PROBLEM: NO BAD SCHOOLS, ONLY WEAK STUDENTS
Why are urban public schools so disreputable? It could be argued
that cities have a weaker tax base than suburbs and that urban schools are
therefore underfunded.4 But where suburban school districts are of
comparable size to their big-city counterparts, urban school districts
actually outspend suburban districts.5 Table 1 compares suburban districts
with over 50,000 students with their urban counterparts.
TABLE 1: City vs. Suburban Spending Per Pupil6
Atlanta Metro Area
Atlanta

12,994

3. See generally Reid Ewing et al., Growing Cooler: The Evidence on Urban
Development and Climate Change, available at
http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/growingcoolerCH1.pdf (more compact,
urbanized development likely to lead to reduced driving, which in turn will reduce auto
emissions); Maggie L. Grabow et al., Air Quality and Exercise-Related Health Benefits from
Reduced Car Travel in the Midwestern United States (Nov. 2, 2011),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3261937/ (discussing other forms of harm
from auto emissions).
4. See, e.g., Wayne Batchis, Urban Sprawl and the Constitution: Educational
Inequality as an Impetus to Low-Density Living, 42 URB. LAW. 95, 102 (2010) (discussing
“inadequate funding of America’s urban public schools” as a potent disincentive for urban
life).
5. I focus on larger districts because of the difficulties of data collection where
suburbia is divided into dozens of small districts. Also, it is not clear to me whether a district
of one or two schools is comparable to a district with dozens of schools.
6. Public Education Finances: 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, at 8 (issued June 2016)
available at http://census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/econ/g14aspef.pdf (“2014 Finances”) (statistics for District of Columbia); id. at 25-26 (other
statistics).

2017]

THE MIDDLE CLASS, URBAN SCHOOLS, AND CHOICE

Fulton County

9,638

Gwinnett County

9,270

DeKalb County

8,847

Cobb County

8,651

Dallas/Fort Worth Metro Area
Dallas

8,609

Fort Worth

8,641

Plano

8,374

Garland

8,135

Arlington

7,793

Baltimore Metro Area
Baltimore

15,564

Howard County

15,358

Baltimore County

13,338

Anne Arundel County

13,167

Denver Metro Area
Denver

10,564

Jefferson County

8,685

Douglas County

8,182

Houston Metro Area
Houston

8,451

Fort Bend

7,691
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8,240

Washington, D.C. Metro Area
Washington

18,485

Fairfax County

13,710

Montgomery County

15,181

Prince George’s County

13,994

Prince William County

10,216

Loudoun County

12,485

Table 1 reveals a consistent pattern: urban districts always spend
more per pupil than their suburban counterparts.
Even where urban school districts significantly outspend their
suburban counterparts, they fail to attract affluent families. In Kansas City,
Missouri, court-ordered spending caused the city schools to spend three
times as much as some suburban school districts during the 1980s.7
Nevertheless, city test scores failed to improve significantly,8 and the city
schools continued to lose white and middle-class families.9 Today, 89.4%
of Kansas City students are poor enough to be eligible for subsidized
meals10—a percentage higher than most big-city school districts.11
Admittedly, students in low-income areas may cost more to
educate, either because of the inherent disadvantages of growing up with
poverty or because these children may be more likely to suffer from limited
English proficiency or learning disabilities.12 Thus, it might be the case that
7. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 74-79 (1995) (describing history of
desegregation litigation that led to increased spending); id. at 99 (stating that Kansas City
schools spent between $7,665 and $9,412 per pupil, while suburbs spend between $2,854
and $5,956 per pupil).
8. See Molly G. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic
Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1352-53 (2004).
9. See Michael Lewyn, The Law of Sprawl: A Road Map, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
147, 167 n.26 (2006).
10. See District Demographic Data, MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
EDUC.,
http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/District%20and%20Building%20Student%20Indicat
ors/District%20Demographic%20Data.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2017) (2014 data;
percentage has risen from seventy-nine percent in 2006).
11. See infra Table 2.
12. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 699 (“poor students tend to have more social and
academic needs due to the effects of concentrated poverty”); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
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if city schools outspent suburbs by (for example) a ten-to-one margin,
disadvantages arising from family background might be appreciably
narrowed. Since this strategy has never been tried and does not seem
politically feasible in today’s political climate, I am agnostic about its likely
success or failure.
It could also be argued that urban school districts are disreputable
merely because school districts are incompetently run and that better school
boards or better mayors would therefore solve the problem of urban
schools.13 But if school maladministration were the major cause of the
school gap, urban schools would perform poorly regardless of their student
demographics. In fact, urban schools that can screen out low achievers
perform as well as suburban schools. For example, according to U.S. News
and World Report, nine of the ten best high schools in New York State are
within the City of New York.14 All but one of these urban schools are
“exam schools” that screen out low-achieving students.15
Moreover, urban schools often perform well as long as their student
bodies are relatively affluent. For example, one study of Buffalo’s public
schools showed a strong correlation between the share of a school’s student
body living in poverty and its results on standardized mathematics tests.16
Per Pupil Spending Between Selected Inner-City Schools and Suburban Schools Varied by
Metropolitan Area, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Ways and
Means, House of Representatives 1, 5-6 (Dec. 2002),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03234.pdf. I note that this 2002 study found that city
schools were outspent by suburbs in some metropolitan areas; however, even this study
found a fairly even division between regions where cities spent more and those where
suburbs spent more. Id. at 8 (city schools better funded in Boston, Chicago, and St. Louis,
while suburbs received more funding in New York and Fort Worth).
13. Cf. Michael Heise, Law and Policy Entrepreneurs: Empirical Evidence on the
Expansion of School Choice Policy, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1917, 1937 (2012) (“criticizing
the bureaucracy of urban school districts as inefficient and corrupt is a popular sport among
many legislators and governors”).
14. See Best High Schools in New York (2017), U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-high-schools/new-york (last visited Mar. 27, 2017)
(listing best schools as Lehman High School of American Studies, High School for Dual
Language and Asian Studies, Queens High School for the Sciences, Brooklyn Latin,
Baccalaureate School for Global Education, Staten Island Technical High School, Bronx
High School of Science, Townsend Harris High School, one suburban school, and the High
School for Math, Science and Engineering at City College of New York).
15. See CHESTER E. FINN & JESSICA A. HOCKETT, EXAM SCHOOLS: INSIDE AMERICA’S
MOST SELECTIVE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 211-13 (2012) (listing all but one of the nationally ranked
New York City schools mentioned in prior footnote as exam schools).
16. See Gary Orfield et al., Better Choices for Buffalo’s Students: Expanding and
Reforming the Criteria Schools System, Report to Buffalo Public Schools 1, 21 (May 2015),
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/betterchoices-for-buffalos-students-expanding-reforming-the-criteria-schoolssystem/BPS_UCLACRP_052315_v8_combined.pdf; see also James Traub, What No School
Can Do, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/16/magazine/whatno-school-can-do.html?pagewanted=all (“[New York City Schools] that performed poorly,
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Similarly, pupils in Chicago’s fifteen best urban schools (as measured by
standardized test scores) were, on average, twenty percent low-income,
while the average Chicago school’s pupils are eighty-five percent lowincome.17 Schools dominated by low-income students tend to have poor
reputations because children raised in lower-class households tend to be
less intellectually stimulated at home and thus are less prepared for
school.18 As a result, students from lower-class households tend to achieve
less even when they are in the same school as students from upper-class
households.19
If urban schools with middle- and upper-class students have high
test scores, it follows that urban schools have bad reputations primarily
because they have more disadvantaged students than suburban schools.
Thus, urban schools’ ability to attract middle-class parents is limited by a
vicious circle: their social makeup leads to poor reputations,20 which scares
off middle-class parents, which ensures a low-income student body, which
ensures that these schools continue to have poor reputations.
II. WHY ARE URBAN SCHOOLS POVERTY-PACKED?
Urban schools are dominated by low-income students in large part
because of school residency requirements. State and local legislation
typically requires that in order to attend a public school in a school district,

like those that performed well, scored almost exactly as the socioeconomic status of the
children in them would have predicted. You could have predicted the fourth-grade test
scores of all but one of the city’s 32 districts merely by knowing the percentage of students
in a given district who qualified for a free lunch. Only a few dozen of the city’s 675
elementary schools scored well despite high poverty rates. In other words, good schools
aren’t doing that much good, and bad schools aren’t doing that much harm.”).
17. See Daniel Hertz, Gentrification’s Impact on Neighborhood Schools’ Success
(Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.chicago-bureau.org/op-ed-gentrifications-impact-onneighborhood-schools-success (referring to neighborhood schools in which more than
twenty-five percent of students achieved a standardized test score that “exceeds standards”
and is thus on track for college); see also id.
18. See Michael Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just An Environmental Issue, 84
MARQ. L. REV. 301, 324 (2000) (quoting statements by numerous social scientists that the
quality of schooling accounts for less than half of the variation in students’ academic
performance).
19. Id. at 324-25 (citing examples).
20. And sometimes school discipline problems as well. Rightly or wrongly, many
middle-class parents associate poverty-stricken urban schools with high levels of violence
and disruptiveness. Cf. Michelle Parthum, Using Litigation to Address Violence in Urban
Public Schools, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2011) (discussing “everyday violence of
inner-city schools”).
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you must live in that district.21 Even the most prosperous central cities
generally have more poor people than many of their suburbs.22 If, as
suggested above, diverse schools usually have worse reputations than
schools full of middle-income students, most urban schools will therefore
have worse reputations than most suburban schools.
But neighborhood poverty alone does not explain why entire urban
school districts have bad reputations. If a school’s student body always
reflected its neighborhood, schools in affluent parts of a city would have
“good” schools (by that I mean schools that had high test scores and were
perceived by parents as desirable) even if most city schools were
undesirable. However, this is only the case where such schools draw their
student bodies only from affluent neighborhoods.23 But some school
attendance zones draw from a larger, more socially diverse geographic
area.24 As a result, even schools in affluent urban areas sometimes scare off
middle-class parents.
In the late twentieth century, federal courts inadvertently
exacerbated this problem through their often-futile efforts to desegregate
urban public schools. In the 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of
Education,25 the Supreme Court prohibited government-mandated
segregation of local schools. White parents were not eager, however, to
send their children to desegregated schools—partially because of irrational
racism, and partially because the white middle-class parents of sixty years
ago, like today’s middle-class parents, might have wanted to avoid schools
filled with disadvantaged children, and most blacks then had poverty-level
incomes.26 So, “white flight” from integrated urban schools began. In
Washington, D.C., for example, white enrollment in city schools declined

21. See Yvonne Vissing, Homeless Children and Youth: An Examination of Legal
Challenges and Directions, 13 J. L. SOCIETY 455, 486 (2012); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S.
321 (1983) (upholding constitutionality of such requirements).
22. See Michael Lewyn, How Real is Gentrification?, 43 REAL EST. L.J. 344, 346
(2014) (citing examples).
23. See Hertz, supra note 17 (citing example).
24. My own life presents an example. From kindergarten through fifth grade, I
attended Jackson Elementary, a highly reputed Atlanta neighborhood school with very few
low-income children. But for middle school, my address put me in the attendance zone for
Sutton, a school that drew not only from Jackson’s rich neighborhood but from poorer areas
as well. My parents quickly pulled me out of the Atlanta public school system.
25. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. In 1959, fifty-six percent of blacks lived below the poverty level, more than three
times the white poverty level of eighteen percent. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, Poverty in
the United States: 1959 to 1968, Current Population Reports 1 (Dec. 31, 1969), available at
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/1969/demo/p60-68a.pdf.
By contrast, today about twenty percent of blacks have poverty-level incomes, just under
twice the white poverty level of 12.7%. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 48
(Sarah Janssen ed. 2016). Thus, the income gap between blacks and whites was even larger
than it is today.
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by half between 1954 and 1963.27 These whites generally moved to
suburbs.28 Suburban public schools were often heavily white, and thus were
not affected by Brown.
But Brown, standing alone, did not affect all urban schools.
Although the Court had outlawed explicit segregation by race, it had not yet
addressed the constitutionality of facially neutral policies that tended to
place white students in mostly-white schools. Urban school boards took
advantage of this loophole by gerrymandering the boundaries of school
attendance zones.29 For example, in Kansas City, Missouri, the school
board frequently shifted white neighborhoods from integrated attendance
zones to nearby zones full of predominantly white schools.30 The school
district also placed new schools in areas that were all-white or all-black.31
So in the late 1950s and early 1960s, whites in the most integrated
neighborhoods were still subject to desegregation, but other urban whites
could still send their children to almost all-white schools. As a result, public
schools promoted “white flight” only in cities’ more diverse neighborhoods.
But in the 1968 case of Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County,32 the Court outlawed a “freedom of choice” plan that permitted
each pupil to choose his or her school on the ground that the plan had failed
to achieve desegregation.33 And in the 1971 case of Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education,34 the Court suggested that evidence of
segregation included “building new schools in the areas of white suburban
expansion farthest from Negro population centers.”35 The Court added that
lower courts could remedy such pro-segregation policies by altering
attendance boundaries or busing students across a city in order to achieve
racial integration.36 So after Green and Swann, any school district that had
27. See RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN 16 (1992) (enrollment declined
from just over 40,000 students to just under 19,000 students). Although other forces
contributed to suburbanization, white enrollment declined especially rapidly in the years
after Brown. For example, between 1951 and 1954, white enrollment declined by about ten
percent (from 45,682 to 40,927 students), but between 1954 and 1957, white enrollment
declined by over twenty percent (from 40,927 students to 31,626 students). Id.
28. Id. at 292 (“almost all of the white flight was to suburban public schools”).
29. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE
ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING 25 (2002). For example, in Washington,
twelve of the thirteen elementary schools west of Rock Creek Park were eighty-five percent
white; see also WOLTERS, supra note 27, at 30.
30. See KEVIN FOX GOTHAM, RACE, REAL ESTATE AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT 104-05
(2d ed. 2015).
31. Id. at 107.
32. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
33. Id. at 439 (lower courts must “assess the effectiveness of a proposed plan in
achieving desegregation”).
34. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
35. Id. at 21.
36. Id. at 27-29; see also Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (explicitly
prohibiting race-conscious attendance zones).
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sought to keep white children in majority white schools could avoid or
resolve lawsuits only by making every school racially integrated.37 Because
most urban school districts had at some point in time enacted such
policies,38 this category included most urban school districts.
The courts’ new emphasis on racial balance meant that even in the
most affluent neighborhoods, urban whites could not send their children to
racially and socially homogenous schools. As a result, “white flight” from
urban schools continued. By 1973, many urban school districts were
already majority black.39 Ultimately, racial integration became impossible
in some urban school systems. For example, if a school system was ninety
percent black, nearly every school in the system would be overwhelmingly
black.
The courts could have responded with “metropolitan
desegregation”—forcing suburban schools as well as city schools to be
racially balanced—thus reducing white parents’ incentives to move to
suburbia. But in the 1974 case of Milliken v. Bradley,40 the Supreme Court
rejected this remedy, holding that as long as a suburb had not segregated its
own schools, it had committed no constitutional violation and thus was not
required to participate in school desegregation.41 As a practical matter, this
meant that if a suburb had no (or almost no) black children and thus had
never sought to segregate them, it was not required to maintain racially
balanced schools.
So, after Milliken, urban parents were faced with this choice: they
could stay in urban schools as those schools continued to become blacker
(and thus, given the high rates of poverty among urban blacks, poorer), or
they could move their children to overwhelmingly white suburbs that were
not subject to constant judicial supervision. Not surprisingly, most white
parents chose the latter option. For example, in Boston, the site of an
especially controversial busing plan, the city’s juvenile white population
declined by more than half during the 1970s alone—despite the fact that the

37. See STEARNS, supra note 29, at 26.
38. See Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith and Metropolitan Segregation, 62
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 364, 379 (2015) (noting that southern school districts required racial
segregation, while in northern school districts “widespread discriminatory
practices . . . including racially gerrymandered attendance boundaries, optional attendance
zones that allowed whites to avoid racially diverse schools, and school construction and
expansion decisions made in locations that prevented student integration from occurring”).
39. Id. at 390 (noting that decline of white enrollment was already widespread); id. at
400 (Detroit schools seventy-two percent black); WOLTERS, supra note 27, at 16
(Washington already ninety-five percent black); ADRIENNE D. DIXON & CELIA K. ROUSSEAU,
CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND EDUCATION: ALL GOD’S CHILDREN GOT A SONG 118 (2014)
(only thirty-three percent of Memphis students white).
40. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
41. Id. at 745 (finding no constitutional violations by school districts in Detroit
suburbs). Cf. Orfield, supra note 38, at 406-16 (criticizing decision).
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city’s single adult white population declined by only three percent.42
Similarly, in the dozen years after the federal courts required Washington,
D.C. to integrate all of its schools, its white public school population
declined by seventy percent, while the single adult white population
decreased by only six percent.43 Eventually, many black middle-class
parents followed suit.44 In some places, racial segregation actually increased
during the age of so-called desegregation: in the Northeast, the percentage
of blacks in majority white schools actually declined between 1968 and
1980.45
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court dismantled many desegregation
orders issued by lower courts, holding that the urban school districts
involved had done as much as possible to desegregate their schools.46 In
fact, the Court now holds that where no desegregation order is in effect, the
Constitution may prohibit school districts from considering a school’s
racial balance when assigning students.47 This means that school districts
may not gerrymander school boundaries either to promote or to prevent
racial balance. But the damage to cities has been done: urban school
districts are stuck with high poverty rates and bad reputations and (despite
the occasional wave of gentrification) are rarely attracting middle-class
parents.
It could be argued that the rise of gentrification is making urban
public schools attractive to middle-class parents again and that the antiurban policies of the late twentieth century are no longer relevant.48 But as
Table 2 shows, large urban school districts continue to have miniscule
white enrollments and high levels of low-income students.

42. See Lewyn, supra note 18, at 328. Thus, it seems unlikely that white flight was
unrelated to public schools.
43. Id.
44. See Orfield, supra note 38, at 432 (describing suburbanization among nonwhites).
45. Id. at 422 (noting decline from thirty-three percent to twenty percent). However,
this percentage increased modestly in the South and Midwest. Id. Orfield explains that the
South has more countywide school districts, which means that whites would have to travel
significantly further to find a suburban district to flee to. Id. at 421.
46. Id. at 420.
47. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 732
(2007) (plurality opinion) (“[R]acial balancing is not permitted.”). I note, however, that the
reach of this decision is unclear. A four-justice plurality flatly rejected the consideration of
racial balancing, while Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is less clear. Id. at 782, 787-89
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (desegregation plan at issue not “narrowly tailored to achieve its
own ends” and thus unconstitutional; however, schools may adopt race-conscious measures
in order to achieve a diverse student body).
48. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 1, at 698 (“While urban schools in most gentrifying
areas are still undoubtedly predominately minority and poor, an increasing number of young
middle-class white residents with children are deciding to give the urban public schools a
chance.”).
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TABLE 2: Race and Class in Urban49 School Districts for Selected50
Older Cities51
Percent low-income
Percent white non(that is, eligible for
Hispanic
subsidized school
lunch)
New York

66.1

15.0

Chicago

84.9

9.2

Philadelphia

85.5

14.3

San Francisco

57.5

10.8

Detroit

81.0

2.6

Washington

53.8

11.5

Boston

71.7

13.2

Baltimore

84.1

8.0

Milwaukee

82.3

13.9

Minneapolis

65.7

36.4

Cleveland

Not available

14.8

St. Louis

68.4

9.9

49. By “urban” I mean school districts limited to a major city, as opposed to suburban
districts or countywide districts which include both a city and its suburbs (such as Los
Angeles United, which includes some suburbs as well as the city of Los Angeles).
50. In particular, this table includes cities with available relevant data that: (1) are
“inelastic” cities (that is, cities that are unable to annex their suburbs, and thus trapped
within their mid-twentieth century boundaries); and (2) had over 500,000 people in 1950.
See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS: A CENSUS 2010 PERSPECTIVE 75 (2013)
(defining “inelastic” cities); THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS , supra note 26, at
614 (listing cities’ 1950 populations). I focus on these cities because elastic cities are often
in less dire shape; a city that can annex hundreds of square miles may, by taking over its
suburbs, make “white flight” inconvenient. Cf. supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting
that geographically enormous counties were able to integrate schools).
51. Digest of Education Statistics, Table 215.10, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS (2014),
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/tables/dt14_215.10.asp?current=yes.
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Pittsburgh

69.4

33.6

Cincinnati

65.3

26.8

Buffalo

74.9

22.2

In sum, parents seek suburban schools because urban public
schools have bad reputations. Urban schools have bad reputations because
many of their children come from disadvantaged backgrounds. As a result,
these children are less prepared for school than middle-class children.
These schools have a high concentration of poverty due to the structure of
state and local attendance zone laws, which ensure that a city’s schools
must be at least as diverse as their juvenile populations. The concentration
of poverty is also a result of the federal courts’ school desegregation
rulings, which prevented cities from creating separate zones for their
whitest, most affluent neighborhoods. Thus, government at all levels is
responsible for the low status of urban schools.
III. USEFUL BUT IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS
As long as affluent suburbs are allowed to create separate school
districts,52 there may be no easy way to make poverty-packed municipalities
more popular. However, urban life could become more popular if the
government broke the link between residence and schooling. If this was the
case, parental choice would expand, for city residents would not be limited
to public schools in urban neighborhoods. If the government subsidizes
your health insurance through Medicare (or you benefit from some other
form of government-subsidized insurance), you are not limited to attending
52. I note, however, that state or federal authorities could quickly eliminate the
“school-generated sprawl” problem by eliminating this option. If a state or region wished to
make every school demographically identical, it could abolish suburban school districts,
place every school in the region in one giant school district, and assign students to schools in
a way that ensured that every single school had the same socio-economic makeup. If this
were the case, parents would have little incentive to move to suburbs. However, it seems to
me that this policy would be so unpopular with suburbanites as to be beyond the realm of
political feasibility. Moreover, in metropolitan areas that spread across hundreds or
thousands of square miles, it might be costly as well; where rich and poor areas are ten or
twenty miles from each other, students might have to be bused many miles to reach their
assigned school. And in the absence of land use regulations that prevented developers from
building suburbs outside the school district, parents might move even further into suburbia to
escape the new super-district. On the other hand, a radically libertarian state could make
suburbs less popular by simply eliminating public schools; if this was the case, prestigious
schools would be no more likely to concentrate in suburbs than any privately provided good
or service. However, this too seems so far beyond the bounds of feasibility as to be not
worth extended discussion.
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the doctors or hospitals closest to your home. So why should schooling be
any different?53
Americans have experimented with several policies designed to
increase school choice, including: (1) voucher systems including private
schools; (2) “open enrollment” systems that do not affect private schools,
but allow urban students to attend suburban public schools; (3) charter
schools; and (4) exam schools. Each of these techniques may reduce sprawl
if properly designed, but all have financial and social costs.
(1).

Universal Vouchers

The most market-oriented, anti-sprawl education policy is some
form of a voucher system. Under the purest form of a voucher system,
parents who choose to avoid public schools would be “given a voucher, a
piece of paper redeemable for a designated sum of money if, and only if, it
is used to pay the cost of schooling your child at an approved school.”54 If
vouchers were extended to private schools, parents would arguably have
little reason to avoid city neighborhoods; they could stay in the city and
attend private schools for the same amount of money that they would spend
on public schools (that is, zero).
However, as long as a voucher system supported both private
schools and existing public schools, two practical difficulties might make
the system either less effective or more costly. First, some private schools
are more expensive than public schools. Public schools spend roughly
$11,000 per pupil55—roughly comparable to the average private school
tuition.56 However, many private schools are far more expensive. The
average nonreligious private school costs $17,000 per year57 and some

53. Admittedly, one significant difference exists between medicine and education:
because most patients only occasionally seek medical attention, there is no reason why a
patient must commit to seeing the same doctor or hospital every day. By contrast, children
attend school every day for half a year; as a result, a school needs to know in advance how
many children to plan for. Otherwise, schools would be overwhelmed if the number of
pupils suddenly increased from week to week. Thus, schools need to know their student
bodies near the start of an academic year. But current residency requirements are not
necessary to achieve this goal. If students throughout a city or region were allowed to choose
schools a few months before the first day of classes, schools would know the size of their
student bodies a few months in advance and could govern themselves accordingly.
54. MILTON FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 161 (1980).
55. See Public Education Finances: 2014, supra note 6, at 28. Of the 100 largest
school systems, only about twenty spend more than this amount. Id. at 25-26.
56. See Average Private School Tuition Cost (2016-17), PRIVATE SCHOOL REVIEW, at
http://www.privateschoolreview.com/tuition-stats/private-school-cost-by-state (last visited
Apr. 2, 2017).
57. See Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to Be Learned, 64
FLA. L. REV. 1723, 1774 n.291 (2012).
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charge as much as $20,000 to $30,000 tuition.58 It logically follows that if
vouchers covered the entire cost of private school tuition, educational costs
to taxpayers would increase.
On the other hand, if vouchers merely covered the cost of the
average public school, they might cover less than half of some private
schools’ tuition—arguably not enough to discourage most parents from
choosing suburban public schools.59 But even so, such a partial discount
would still do something to encourage parents to stay in cities and would
thus improve upon the status quo.60
A second difficulty is that even a limited voucher system might
increase municipal costs, because the government’s public school expenses
would not decrease as fast as its private school expenses would increase.
Imagine a voucher system in which the money follows the child—that is, if
each voucher is $10,000, and a school loses a child to a private school, that
school loses $10,000. Some of the public schools’ costs are presumably
fixed, such as the costs of buildings and maintenance.61 So if a public
school that spends $10,000 per pupil loses ten pupils under a voucher
system, its costs will decrease by less than $100,000.
A voucher system that fails to account for this difficulty might
starve public schools that lose students, causing those schools to lose
resources or even be closed due to fiscal scarcity—a result that may be
harmful for students in those schools and that may even make declining

58. See, e.g., Tuition & Financial Assistance, ATLANTA JEWISH ACADEMY,
http://www.atljewishacademy.org/admissions/161-tuition-financial-assistance (last visited
Mar. 27, 2017) (high school tuition just over $24,000); Tuition, NICHOLS SCHOOL,
https://www.nicholsschool.org/admissions/international-students/tuition (last visited Mar.
27, 2017) (similar tuition at secular private school in Buffalo); Tuition & Fees For The
2016-17 School Year, JACK M. BARRACK HEBREW ACADEMY,
https://www.jbha.org/admissions/tuition-and-fees.php (last visited Mar. 27, 2017) (high
school tuition just over $30,000). But cf. Terry M. Moe, Beyond the Free Market: The
Structure of School Choice, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 572 (2008) (Milwaukee vouchers of
$6,000 per child “enough to pay for tuition at virtually all private schools in that city”).
59. I note that voucher systems actually in existence are generally targeted towards the
poor or to special-needs students. Moe, supra note 58, at 569-70 (citing examples); Lewyn,
supra note 18, at 372 n.515 (citing other examples). However, these programs are irrelevant
to the purpose of this Article, which is to discuss programs that might encourage middleclass families to stay in cities.
60. My discussion assumes, of course, that parents of children at more expensive
schools would be able to add vouchers onto their school tuition. Some commentators oppose
such “add-ons” because they wish to prevent more affluent parents from buying their way
into more expensive schools. See Moe, supra note 58, at 573. This argument might make
sense in the context of a voucher program designed to help poor people escape failing urban
schools. But a prohibition on “add-ons” makes no sense in the context of an anti-sprawl
program, since a major purpose of the program is to encourage affluent parents to stay in
cities.
61. Id. at 579.
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schools’ neighborhoods less desirable.62 To prevent this outcome, a provoucher city has two choices: to keep public school spending constant (thus
increasing overall education spending) or to fund private schools at some
level below the average per pupil expenditure in order to reduce fiscal harm
to public schools. Under the latter scenario, parents would be able to save
less private school tuition than would otherwise be the case, thus reducing
the anti-sprawl impact of vouchers.
(2).

Public Schools Only

As noted above, a voucher program that includes private schools
would either be more costly than the status quo or would be somewhat
limited; more costly if it funded all private school tuition or more limited if
it only partially funded some schools’ tuition.
By contrast, a school choice program limited to public schools
would avoid these fiscal problems, for the state could simply forbid public
school districts from discriminating on the basis of residence. If a popular
school district wanted to avoid radical increases in enrollment, it would
have to use a lottery to decide which students were admitted. This plan
might discourage sprawl by making prestigious suburban schools available
to urban parents. If both students from affluent families and students from
poor families entered these schools, the class differences between urban and
suburban schools might be erased in the long run. Such an open enrollment
program might actually be more egalitarian than the status quo.
A school choice program limited to public schools may be even
more politically infeasible than universal vouchers for two reasons. First, it
would require a considerable investment (either public or private) in
transportation, since students in search of good schools might wish to go all
over a metropolitan area. Either government will have to buy many more
school buses or parents will have to spend a lot more time transporting their
children to faraway schools. Second, suburbanites will be unwilling to pay
property taxes for schools that other people’s children will attend.63 Thus,
62. Cf. Wilson, supra note 1, at 712 (criticizing closure of schools in distressed
neighborhoods because even academically deficient schools are “one of the most stable
institutions in poor minority urban areas” and vacant school buildings “can exacerbate blight
[and] become a magnet for crime”). It could be argued that these schools should be allowed
to close. But if, as suggested above, a school’s perceived quality reflects its social makeup,
when low-income students of failing schools move to a nearby school, that school could
become equally undesirable. If this was the case, the students who switched schools would
still be in a failing, unpopular school, and be would be stuck with a longer commute.
63. See Aaron Y. Tang, Privileges and Immunities, Public Education, and the Case for
Public School Choice, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1134-35 (2011). For example, suburban
school districts refused to accept students under Cleveland’s voucher program; apparently,
they did not want urban children even if the state paid their expenses. See Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 739, 747 (2002) (“None of the public schools in districts adjacent
to Cleveland have elected to participate.”).
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states might have to take over school financing.
I note that most states have in fact enacted “open enrollment” plans
allowing some inter-district transfers.64 However, these policies are
essentially toothless. In thirty states, school districts are not compelled to
participate.65 Thus, suburban school districts need not accept urban
students. Even in the remaining states, state laws contain loopholes that
give suburbs ample discretion to reject urban students.66 For example, New
Mexico’s statute provides: “Local school boards may admit school-age
persons who do not live within the school district to the public schools
within the school district when there are sufficient school accommodations
to provide for them.”67 Thus, suburban school districts can easily exclude
urbanites by claiming insufficient “accommodations.”68 Moreover, open
enrollment statutes do not grant students the right to be transported across
district lines, which means that students will not be able to attend an out-ofdistrict school unless parents transport them.69 Thus, existing open
enrollment laws do not make it particularly easy for urban students to attend
suburban schools and, therefore, do not eliminate the pro-sprawl bias of
education law.
(3).

Charter Schools

Since the first charter school opened in 1991, forty-two states have
authorized charter schools.70 A charter school is a hybrid between a private
school and a public school. Charters are publicly financed to some extent71
and do not charge tuition,72 but they often receive less public money than
traditional public schools.73 These schools are governed by their trustees
rather than by public officials and are exempt from most personnel rules

64. See Tang, supra note 63, at 1113 (“forty-two states have enacted policies
authorizing some form of inter-district open enrollment”).
65. Id. at 1114.
66. Id.
67. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-12-5(A) (2011) (emphasis added).
68. See Tang, supra note 63, at 1115 (budgetary considerations are major motive for
districts’ refusal to allow inter-district transfers).
69. Id. at 1119.
70. See Preston C. Green III et al., The Legal Status of Charter Schools in State
Statutory Law, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 240, 243 (2014).
71. Id. at 261-63 (discussing litigation over charter schools’ use of public funds).
72. See Wendy Parker, From the Failure of Desegregation to the Failure of Choice,
40 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 117, 125 (2012).
73. See Noelle Quam, Big Philanthropy’s Unrestrained Influence on Public
Education: A Call for Change, 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 601, 621 (2015)
(“On average, charter schools receive sixty-one percent of the government funding that their
district counterparts receive.”).
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governing public schools74 as well as from state laws governing student
discipline.75
In theory, charter schools, like private schools financed by
vouchers, could provide a palatable alternative to urban public schools,
causing middle-class parents to shun suburban public schools.76 But in fact,
the majority of charter school students are low-income,77 and charter
schools tend to have academic achievement levels roughly comparable to
those of nearby public schools.78
Why have charter schools generally failed to attract middle-class
parents? States generally do not allow charters to choose their students.
Instead, state laws generally provide that when a charter cannot
accommodate all interested families, it must either follow a “first come,
first served” admissions policy or use a lottery to choose its students.79
From an egalitarian perspective, this policy makes sense because it prevents
charters from becoming enclaves dominated by the privileged.80
But from a “sprawl control” perspective, this policy is less helpful.
If charters are not selective, they will often have student bodies that
resemble traditional urban public schools (as is in fact the case).81 If parents
do not wish to send their children to poverty-packed urban public schools,
they will also not wish to send their children to poverty-packed urban
charter schools.
One possible alternative is state legislation allowing charters to be
as academically selective as private schools or urban “exam schools.”82 If
74. See Green et al., supra note 70, at 243.
75. Id. at 265-67; see also Kaylee Niemasik, Teen Pregnancy in Charter Schools:
Pregnancy Discrimination Challenges Under The Equal Protection Clause and Title IX, 22
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 55, 60-61 (2015).
76. It could also be argued that competition from charter schools forces public schools
to improve in order to retain students. See Niemasik, supra note 75, at 60. Because this
article is about urbanism rather than education policy, the wisdom of that argument is
beyond the scope of the article.
77. Id. (fifty-four percent of charter school pupils low-income). Similarly, only thirtynine percent of charter school students are white, as opposed to fifty-six percent of students
in traditional public schools. See Parker, supra note 72, at 138 n.100.
78. Parker, supra note 72, at 150.
79. Id. at 125.
80. But cf. Wilson, supra note 1, at 713 (arguing that lotteries are insufficiently
egalitarian because “gentrified families who tend to have more time, resources and cultural
capital to navigate the lottery process are more likely to apply and gain admission to the
better charter schools”). I note that charter schools are in a no-win position from the
perspective of egalitarian critics: if they enroll middle-class families, they exclude the
poor—but if they do not, they are just another way to concentrate poverty.
81. In fact, charter schools are more heavily nonwhite than, and may be even more
racially segregated than, traditional urban public schools. See Parker, supra note 72, at 138
n.100 (only thirty-nine percent of charter school students white, as opposed to fifty-six
percent of traditional public school students); id. at 140-42.
82. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing exam schools).
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this was the case, charter schools might look like urban private schools: less
selective schools might continue to be dominated by the disadvantaged, but
the most selective schools would attract middle-class parents who wished to
stay in the city but avoid typical urban public schools.
On the other hand, if existing charter schools were to convert to
selective charters, charter slots for weaker students might disappear, thus
reducing choices for such students.83 If this was the case, selective charter
schools could actually reduce some parents’ educational choices. It is
unclear to what extent this would occur; individual schools would have to
weigh their desire to attract middle-class pupils against their desire to fill as
many seats as possible.
(4).

Exam Schools

As noted above, some urban school districts have academically
selective “exam schools” that achieve results better than those of most
suburban schools.84 Why have these exam schools failed to attract most
middle-class parents?
Most cities’ exam school systems are insufficient to meet potential
demand for two reasons. First, exam schools are often limited to high
school. For example, St. Louis’s only exam school is a high school, as are
seven of Chicago’s eight exam schools and all of the exam schools in
Baltimore, Washington, Detroit, and Cleveland.85 Almost no exam school
begins in the early grades; of the over 200 exam schools listed in one book
about the subject, only six begin before fourth grade.86 But by the time their
children reach high school age (or even middle school age), some middleclass parents have already moved to suburbia. So for exam schools to
attract middle-class parents, they should begin in the early grades.
Second, there are not enough exam schools to meet potential
middle-class demand. For example, St. Louis has just over 7,000 people
enrolled in its high schools,87 but its lone exam school, Metro High
School,88 has only 335 students.89 Similarly, Buffalo’s City Honors (the
83. Cf. Wilson, supra note 1, at 713 (suggesting that this is already the case because
“charter schools tend to deny students with behavioral problems and students with
disabilities” and public schools have less money to educate such students as a result of
competition from charter schools).
84. See FINN & HOCKETT, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
85. See id. at 205-14.
86. Id. at 205-15.
87. See MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., St. Louis City,
http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/District%20and%20School%20Information/Missour
i%20School%20Directory.aspx?rp:DistrictCode=115115 (last visited Mar. 27, 2017).
88. See FINN & HOCKETT, supra note 15, at 209.
89. See St. Louis City, supra note 87 (go to “St. Louis City-Summary Reports,” then to
“School District Report Card-Building,” then find Metro High).
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city’s lone exam school, which begins in fifth grade)90 has just over 1,000
students,91 about six percent of the city’s fifth through twelfth grade
enrollment.92 In these school districts, children who are not among the top
five percent of students must attend the less prestigious traditional public
schools. A family deciding whether to invest in a city might be able to
guess with reasonable certainty whether its children will be among the top
fifty percent of district children, but might not be able to guess whether
their children will be among the top five percent. It logically follows that a
school district wishing to lure parents to suburbia should probably have
enough exam schools to accommodate a much higher number of children—
perhaps the top quarter or top third.
However, creating new schools might be more expensive than
allowing the formation of charter schools. Charter schools are only partially
publicly financed,93 while exam schools are completely publicly financed
and thus a bigger drain on governmental resources. To avoid increasing
overall education spending, a school system might be tempted to reduce
spending on the remaining non-exam schools. Because the latter schools
would contain the hardest-to-educate students, reducing spending on such
schools might be inequitable and even counterproductive in the long run
(assuming arguendo that reduced school spending in fact led to reduced life
opportunities for the non-exam school students).
(5).

Choice vs. Equity

It could be argued that all of these proposals could increase social
segregation, for if urban middle-class parents are allowed to choose
selective schools (whether they be private, public, or charter), these schools
might be almost entirely middle- or upper-class.94 If this was the case,
children from lower-income households might be stuck in hypersegregated, homogenously poor schools. But this concern accurately
describes the status quo: poor children are stuck in troubled schools in cities
and low-income suburbs, and most other children attend middle-class
90. See FINN & HOCKETT, supra note 15, at 211.
91. See City Honors Sch-F Masten Park Enrollment (2014-2015),
https://data.nysed.gov/enrollment.php?year=2015&instid=800000052908 (last visited Mar.
27, 2017).
92. See Buffalo City School District Enrollment (2014-2015),
https://data.nysed.gov/enrollment.php?year=2015&instid=800000052968 (last visited Mar.
27, 2017) (total enrollment 18,764).
93. See supra notes 71 & 73 and accompanying text.
94. I note, however, that this is not currently true of exam schools. See FINN &
HOCKETT, supra note 15, at 32 (students in exam schools generally about as likely to be
eligible for subsidized lunches as all public high school students); id. at 33-34 (fifty-two
percent of Chicago exam school students, fifty-one percent of Philadelphia exam school
students, forty-six percent of Washington, D.C. exam schools students, and forty-one percent
of Boston exam school students eligible).
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suburban schools. Unless the state or federal government wipes out
homogenously affluent suburban schools,95 segregation by social class is
inevitable. Our only choice is whether to continue the current system of
separate municipalities for the poor and the middle and upper classes
(which combines school segregation and residential segregation) or whether
to allow affluent parents to attend the middle-class schools they crave
without moving to suburbs.96 Even if the latter system causes the same
amount of school segregation as the status quo, neighborhoods would be
less segregated because some parents who are unwilling to send their
children to diverse schools might be willing to live in diverse
neighborhoods.
It could also be argued that if school boards hired the right teachers
or created the right curriculum, middle-class households would choose even
the most socially diverse schools over suburbia. One way of testing this
theory is to examine the most successful charter schools. If better teachers
could bring the middle-class back to urban schools, the best urban charters
would have achieved this goal. But, in fact, this has not consistently been
the case. For example, the film “Waiting for Superman” describes Locke
High School and KIPP LA Prep School in Los Angeles as unusually
successful charter schools.97 But in both schools, over ninety percent of
students are still poor enough to be eligible for government-subsidized
lunches.98 Thus, it seems unlikely that education reform alone will solve the
problem of school-related sprawl.
A related argument is that if schools spent more on social services,
urban schools would improve enough to become attractive to middle-class
95. See supra note 52 (discussing this option).
96. Or homogenously middle- and upper-class city neighborhoods. See Wilson, supra
note 1, at 715 (suggesting that Washington, D.C. has altered school attendance zones to
exclude lower-class students from city’s best performing middle and high schools); Hertz,
supra note 17 (noting that Chicago’s most affluent areas tend to have city’s highest test
scores).
97. See Diane Ravitch, The Success of Charter Schools is A Myth, in MARGARET
HAERENS & LYNN M. ZOTT, CHARTER SCHOOLS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 34, 38, 45 (2012).
98. See KIPP Los Angeles College Preparatory School, GREATSCHOOLS,
http://www.greatschools.org/california/los-angeles/12371-KIPP-Los-Angeles-CollegePreparatory-School/details/#Students (last updated Mar. 22, 2017) (ninety-three percent of
students eligible for reduced-price lunches); Alain Leroy Locke College Prep Academy,
GREATSCHOOLS, http://www.greatschools.org/california/los-angeles/24830-Alain-LeroyLocke-College-Prep-Academy/details/#Students (last updated Mar. 22, 2017) (ninety-one
percent). I note that these schools also have test scores well below those of prestigious
suburban schools—a fact suggesting the difficulty of overcoming the problems caused by a
poor home environment. 2015 Test Results for English Language Arts/Literacy and
Mathematics, CALIFORNIA ASSESSMENT OF STUDENT PERFORMANCE AND PROGRESS,
http://caaspp.cde.ca.gov/sb2015/Search (last visited Mar. 27, 2017) (Thirteen percent of
KIPP students and three percent of Locke students reached highest “Standard Exceeded”
score in reading, as opposed to thirty-six percent in suburban Beverly Vista Elementary
School and thirty-one percent in suburban Beverly Hills High.).
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parents. For example, one commentator writes that Cincinnati has improved
test scores through adding “health care, counseling, adult education, and
cultural events . . . [in] community learning centers.”99 In other words, more
spending yields better results, which in turn brings middle-class people into
the school system.
It may be true that Cincinnati’s schools have improved modestly in
recent years. Although the state of Ohio’s “Report Card” for that school
district is dominated by Ds and Fs, some of the district’s test scores have
improved.100 Nevertheless, any argument based on Cincinnati’s alleged
success fails for several reasons. First, as noted above, there is little
correlation between a school district’s spending level and its prestige: urban
school districts that spend more than their suburbs nevertheless fail to
attract middle-class students.101 Second, the claim overlooks the nationwide
failure of social spending to prevent middle-class flight from urban schools:
during the late twentieth century, government spending on education and
other social services increased massively102—yet middle-class flight
continued to occur.103 Third, the use of Cincinnati’s improvement to
support the argument that increased government spending improves
education rests on a slender factual basis: between 2012 and 2015,
education spending in Cincinnati actually decreased from $14,719 per pupil
to $13,626 per pupil.104 Also, between 2007 and 2015, Cincinnati’s
spending increased but by less than the statewide average. Cincinnati’s
spending increased from $12,021 per pupil to $13,626 per pupil (a sixteen
percent increase), while in the average Ohio school district, spending
increased from $9,343 per pupil to $10,973 per pupil (a seventeen percent

99. Wilson, supra note 1, at 730.
100. Cincinnati City School District, 2014-15, Ohio School Report Cards 1, (Aug. 21,
2016), available at
http://reportcard.education.ohio.gov/Archives%20TS/043752/043752/043752_20142015_DIST.pdf (giving the Cincinnati school district an F for graduation rates, achievement
indicators met, and closing racial gaps, but giving the district an A on “value added”—that
is, yearly progress for grades four through eight).
101. See supra Tables 1 & 2 (city districts outspend suburban districts).
102. See Digest of Education Statistics, Table 164, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
(May 1995) https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d95/dtab164.asp (spending per pupil tripled
in constant dollars between 1959 and 1990); AXEL R. SCHAFER, PIETY AND PUBLIC FUNDING:
EVANGELICALS AND THE STATE IN MODERN AMERICA 42-44 (2012) (describing increases in
other social service spending).
103. It could be argued that without such spending increases, urban schools would be
even worse. But even if this was so, it seems clear that this benefit was inadequate to prevent
middle-class parents from preferring suburban schools.
104. See District Profile Reports (Cupp Report), OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., CTR. FOR SCH.
FIN., http://education.ohio.gov/Topics/Finance-and-Funding/School-PaymentReports/District-Profile-Reports (last updated Feb. 28, 2017) (data for FY 2012 and 2015).
For data on an individual year, click the links on the page for a specific year. Then to find
data on a specific school district, go to the links in the middle of the yearly report.
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increase).105 Fourth, Cincinnati was not appreciably more successful in
attracting middle-class students; the percentage of low-income students
decreased between 2008 and 2014, but only from 67.8%106 to 65.3%.107
CONCLUSION
Every conceivable school assignment policy involves trade-offs
between cost, urbanism, choice, and equity. The current system discourages
urban life, provides limited choices, and is highly inequitable (insofar as it
limits educational opportunities for urban students). However, it may be
less costly than some alternatives.
A voucher system that pays all students’ private school tuition
would maximize parental choice and maximize parental ability to escape
troubled urban schools, but would be highly costly. A system that pays a
fixed amount regardless of a school’s tuition would be cheaper but would
do less to discourage sprawl. Under that system, many private schools
would continue to be more expensive than suburban public schools.
A “public schools only” voucher system would be highly
egalitarian in that even students who would not gain admission to
academically selective private schools would be eligible for the program. In
addition, such an open enrollment system would increase parental choice
and might effectively enable parents to escape troubled urban schools.
However, spending on transportation costs might increase. In particular,
public spending would increase if the government funded more buses to
suburbia, and private spending on cars would increase otherwise.
By contrast, there is no obvious reason why selective charter
schools would be more costly than the status quo. However, their impact on
urbanism is less predictable. If Americans created selective urban charter
schools in large numbers, such schools might successfully compete with
suburban public schools. But if existing charter schools turn into selective
schools, choice might be impaired for students who would be unable to
attend such schools.
The creation of more exam schools would avoid this problem. A
city that built new exam schools would by definition be creating more
choices for parents—choices that would cater to high achievers and thus
make urban schools more appealing for middle-class parents. So urbanism
and choice favor this policy. On the other hand, any educational expansion
creates a difficult trade-off between cost and equity: new schools would be
costly unless financed on the backs of existing schools.

105. Id. (data for FY 2006 and FY 2015).
106. See Digest of Education Statistics, Table 94, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS
(Oct. 2010), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_094.asp (2008 data).
107. See supra Table 2.
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In sum, there is a wide variety of school reforms that would make
urban life more palatable to middle-class parents—but no reform is costfree.
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